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I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS CORPORATE LIABILITY?
Under the doctrine of hospital corporate liability, a hospital has
a nondelegable, direct duty to provide adequate care to all of its
patients.' This duty is not a product of a master-servant or a
principal-agent relationship, 2 nor is hospital tort liability predicated
on a showing of vicarious liability, because the hospital's liability flows
directly from the hospital to its patients.3 Consequently, a hospital
may be liable for the negligent act of an independent staff physician,
even if that physician is an independent contractor. 4 The corporate
liability, or corporate negligence,5 doctrine thus extends potential
liability beyond the sphere of respondeat superior.
Although many courts have recognized corporate liability as an
"emerging trend" throughout the country,6 reviewing courts should
consider carefully the reasons supporting the doctrine and the ways in
which many courts now apply it. As health care issues play an
1. Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 527 Pa. 330, 591 A.2d 703, 707 (1991); Elam v. College Park
Hasp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, 159 n.5 (1982); Johnson v. Misericordia Commu-
nity Hosp., 99 Wis. 2d 708, 301 N.W.2d 156, 163 (1980). See also Arthur F. Southwick, The
Hospital as an Institution-Expanding Responsibilities Change Its Relationship with the Staff
Physician, 9 Cal. W. L. Rev. 429, 440 (1973).
2. See, for example, Pedroza v. Byrant, 101 Wash.2d 266, 677 P.2d 166, 168-69 (1984):
Elam, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 159. See also Barbara Werthman, Medical Malpractice Law: How
Medicine Is Changing the Law § 1.04 at 19-25 (Lexington, 1984); Part IV (discussing the evolution
of hospital liability and respondeat superior).
3. See, for example, Pedroza, 677 P.2d at 168-69; Elam, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 163-64; Johnson,
301 N.W.2d at 163 n.14, 164; Tucson Medical Center, Inc. v. Misevch, 113 Ariz. 34, 545 P.2d 958,
959 (1976). For examples of recent cases, see Humana Medical Corp. of Ala. v. Traffanstedt, 597
S.2d 667, 668-69 (Ala. 1992); Thompson, 591 A.2d at 707.
4. See, for example, Humana, 597 S.2d at 668-69 (citing 8 Causes of Action 427, 431
(1985)). In the master-servant arena, an independent contractor is a nonemployee who is not
under the complete and direct control of the person who is contracting for the work to be done.
See Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 2, 220 (1958). The Restatement (Second) of Agency
defines an independent contractor as "a person who contracts with another to do something for
him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the other's right to control with respect
to his physical conduct in the performance of the undertaking." Id. § 2.
5. Some courts and commentators have referred to corporate liability as corporate
negligence. See, for example, Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 163 n.14; Pedroza, 677 P.2d at 168; Elam,
183 Cal. Rptr. at 157.
6. See Humana, 597 S.2d at 668, for a listing of recent cases.
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increasingly greater role in American society, courts have a greater
obligation to apply articulable guidelines uniformly when determining
hospital liability. Unfortunately, despite the courts' ability to rectify
the existing uncertainty, they have treated corporate liability
disparately thus far. The corporate liability doctrine has a useful and
practical application but only when applied in limited and clearly
defined circumstances.
Part II of this Note discusses hospitals' evolution into modern,
health-care providing entities. An examination of the emergence of
the modern hospital as a corporate institution provides the framework
for the creation and application of the corporate liability doctrine.
Part III examines the doctrine of corporate liability as a response to
the significant changes in the modern hospital, discussing and
analyzing the duties that the major cases have articulated and
imposed. Part IV discusses the evolution of hospital liability from the
exposure-free beginnings of charitable immunity through the present-
day imposition of corporate liability. Part V analyzes the standards
and guidelines courts may consider in determining the imposition of
hospital corporate liability. This Part primarily explores the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO)7
guidelines as a source that courts may use to assess potential hospital
corporate liability. Part VI shows that the courts have not applied the
standards uniformly or consistently, primarily because they have
relied on different standards at different times or have applied the
same set of standards inconsistently. Thus, courts irresponsibly have
allowed the corporate liability doctrine to remain imprecisely defined,
leaving hospitals exposed to almost limitless liability without the
reasonable ability to take preventive measures." Finally, Part VII
suggests a more effective method for assessing hospital liability,
allowing courts to apply the standards more evenly.
7. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) is now known as the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO). The change in name does
not represent any change in the commission itself but merely reflects the fact that many different
health organizations now provide care in the manner of the traditional hospital.
8. Humana, 597 S.2d at 668; Thompson, 591 A.2d at 707; Pedroza, 677 P.2d at 172. See
Part VI for a discussion of the distinctions that courts may" create by imposing this imprecisely
defined liability.
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II. THE MODERN HOSPITAL AS A CORPORATE INSTITUTION
Traditionally, courts viewed hospitals solely as locations for the
practice of medicine by independent physicians.9 The often-repeated
phrase that hospitals do not practice medicine, doctors do,10 reflects
the traditional notion that the pre-modern hospital was a building in
which doctors provided health care rather than a health-care provider
in its own right.1
Courts no longer view hospitals as mere buildings in which
physicians practice medicine,' 2 but as multi-faceted institutions that
furnish far more than the mere facilities for treatment. Hospitals
often are used for research, teaching, diagnosis, therapy, and many
other services; 3 they provide the means and the mechanisms to
address comprehensive and sophisticated health-care concerns. 14
In addition to providing complex and comprehensive medical
equipment and facilities, modern hospitals have become profitable
businesses. 5  Courts have described the modern hospital as a
corporate institution that takes the role of a comprehensive health
care center that must provide and monitor all aspects of health care. 6
Many of today's hospitals function as corporations,' 7 operated and
organized to make a profit.18 Large corporations often own these
private hospitals, subjecting the hospitals to corporate hierarchies and
a strong profit motive. 19 Hospital companies are traded on the New
York Stock Exchange and thus must be treated as market-driven,
9. See Southwick, 9 Cal. W. L. Rev. at 429-35 (cited in note 1).
10. Id. at 566-77. Part IV of this Note discusses the evolution of hospital liability.
11. See Note, Theories for Imposing Liability Upon Hospitals for Medical Malpractice:
Ostensible Agency and Corporate Liabilty, 11 Win. Mitchell L. Rev. 561, 563-64 (1985). See also
Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 164; Elam, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 163-64 (quoting Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at
164). See generally Clark C. Havighurst, ed., Health Care Law and Policy 566-68 (Foundation,
1988).
12. See, for example, Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 164; Elam, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
13. See Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 164; Elam, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 163; Southwick, 9 Cal. W. L.
Rev. at 429 (cited in note 1). See also Jim M. Perdue, Direct Corporate Liability of Hospitals: A
Modern Day Legal Concept of Liability for Injury Occurring in the Modern Day Hospital, 24 S.
Tex. L. J. 773, 773 n.2 (1983) (citing Comment, The Hospital and the Staff Physician-An
Expanding Duty of Care, 7 Creighton L. Rev. 249, 251 n.10 (1974) (discussing the Hospital
Corporation of America as a $400 million per year corporation in 1973)).
14. Note, 11 Win. Mitchell L. Rev. at 568-69 (cited in note 11).
15. See note 21 and accompanying text.
16. Perdoza, 677 P.2d at 169 (quoting Southwick, 9 Cal. W. L. Rev. at 429 (cited in note 1)).
17. See generally Perdue, 24 S. Tex. L. J. at 774-79 (cited in note 13) (discussing the
corporate structure of hospitals in general).
18. Id. at 773. See also Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine, 430.
32 (Basic Books, 1982).
19. Perdue, 24 S. Tex. L. J. at 773-79 (cited in note 13).
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corporate entities.20  According to recent statistics, community
hospitals throughout the country realized an annual net total
revenue 1 of more than $235 billion.22
Because hospitals offer comprehensive medical services within
a corporate structure, courts have found that the public reasonably
may rely on the hospital itself as a health-care provider. The public
expects to be treated and cured by the hospital rather than by
particular nurses or other employees who provide patient care.23
Accordingly, patients often believe that the various health-care practi-
tioners within the hospital render care collectively on the hospital's
behalf.24 Courts repeatedly have found that patients at modern
hospital facilities expect that the hospitals will make reasonable
attempts to cure them.25 Patients also expect that they will receive
care collectively from the health-care providers within the hospital
and that the various health-care providers act independently of each
other, but not independently of the hospital.26 Courts point to the
increased public reliance on sophisticated, profit-generating hospitals
as a major reason for imposing corporate liability.27
20. See Richard B. Siegrist, Jr., Val Street and the For-Profit Hospital Management
Companies, in Bradford H. Gray, ed., The New Health Care for Profit Doctors and Hospitals in a
Competitor Environment 35 (National Academy, 1983). Examples of health-care providers whose
stocks are publicly traded include Humana and Hospital Corporation of America (HCA). Some
hospital stocks have performed well for shareholders over the years. Because their stocks are
traded publicly, companies that are in the business of owning and operating hospitals for profit
face issues such as profitability and quarterly reports to stockholders. Although many public
hospitals operate in this country as well, this Note does not address the distinctions between
public and private hospitals.
21. For purposes of the study cited in this Note, net total revenue includes net patient
revenue, contributions, grants, and all other payments not made on behalf of individual patients.
Net patient revenue is gross revenue less bad debts, charity, and other losses. See American
Hospital Association, American Hospital Association Hospital Statistics xxv (American Hospital
Assoc., 1992-93 ed.).
22. Id. at 204. These statistics rely on 1991 data and are compiled in a survey of American
Hospital Association member hospitals. These statistics show that the hospital industry now
involves huge amounts of money each year.
23. Darling v. Charleston Comm. Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253, 257 (1965)
(quoting Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3,8 (1957)).
24. Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 164. See also Gordon Davenport III, Note, Johnson v! Miseri-
cordia Community Hospital: Corporate Liability of Hospitals Arrives in Wisconsin, 1983 Wis. L.
Rev. 453, 466.
25. See, for example, Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 164 (stating that a "person who avails himself
of our modern 'hospital facilities'.. . expects that the hospital ... will do all it reasonably can do
to cure him..."). See also Elam, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
26. Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 164 (discussing patient expectations). See also Southwick, 9
Cal. W. L. Rev. at 435 (cited in note 1).
27. Pedroza, 677 P.2d at 169.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:535
III. CORPORATE LIABILITY IN RESPONSE TO THE MODERN HOSPITAL:
THE DUTIES COURTS HAVE IMPOSED AND THE JUSTIFICATIONS COURTS
HAVE ARTICULATED
A. Hospital Duties Under Corporate Liability
With its change in status, the hospital has seen a correspond-
ing change in its direct duties to its patients. Hospital duties, which
may give rise to corporate liability if breached, can be divided into four
primary categories .2  These classifications are based on case law that
has evolved over the last twenty-five years.2 9
1. Duty to Furnish Adequate Equipment and Facilities
A hospital has a direct duty to its patients to maintain its fa-
cilities and equipment.30 This duty is the least controversial of all the
direct corporate liabilities 3' and is established by traditional tort
doctrine requiring commercial entities to reasonably maintain the
facilities and equipment offered to the public.32 Courts agree that
hospitals have a nondelegable duty to reasonably maintain their
facilities and equipment.33
2. Duty to Formulate and Follow Rules and Policies
The second nondelegable duty that courts have imposed on
hospitals is the requirement that hospitals formulate, adopt, and
follow specific rules and regulations for patient safety.3 4  Most
28. Although some commentators have articulated six categories of corporate liability, this
Note focuses on the four primary categories of corporate liability courts have established. The six
categories include: (1) negligence in relationship to premises, equipment, or facilities; (2) negligence in
selection or retention of physicians; (3) negligence in supervision of physicians; (4) failure to formulate
medical rules or policies; (5) negligence in formulating medical rules or policies; and (6) negligence
in enforcing medical rules or policies. Perdue, 24 S. Tex. L. J. at 789 (cited in note 13).
29. See Thompson u. Nason Hosp., 527 Pa. 330, 591 A.2d 703, 707 (1991) (citing seminal
cases).
30. Id. (citing Candler General Hosp. Inc. v. Purvis, 123 Ga. App. 339, 181 S.E.2d 77 (1971)).
31. Perdue, 24 S. Tex. L. J. at 789 (cited in note 13). This direct duty rarely has been the fo-
cus of the corporate liability controversy. Many courts describe corporate liability in terms of
negligent selection or negligent review, or both. See, for example, Elam, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 158-59.
32. See Perdue, 24 S. Tex. L. J. at 789-91 (cited in note 13); Restatement (Second) of Torts §
323 (1965).
33. Perdue, 24 S. Tex. L. J. at 789-92 (cited in note 13). See, for example, Thompson, 591
A.2d at 707.
34. Id. (citing Wood u. Samaritan Institution, 26 Cal.2d 847, 161 P.2d 556 (1945)). This duty
simply requires the hospital to establish some guidelines for patient care. See generally Comment,
The Hospital Physician Relationship: Hospital Responsibility for Malpractice Physicians, 50
540
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corporate liability litigaton does not address this duty either.35 When
a hospital fails to establish rules for its physicians or other health-care
practitioners, courts may find the hospital per se negligent 6 If
hospitals have inadequate equipment or lack substantive rules, then
they should be liable for any related problems that arise. The
corporate liability controversies usually involve the manner and
degree to which hospitals have applied the rules and regulations they
have established. 37
3. Duty to Select Physicians Properly
A more controversial nondelegable duty to patients is the re-
quirement that hospitals select their staff physicians properly38 Hos-
pitals must verify and scrutinize physicians' competence before
inviting them to join hospital staffs.39 Hospitals are responsible for
any pertinent information that they knew or should have known when
assessing the applications of physicians and deciding whether to
appoint them to the hospital staff.40 Institutions are liable for the
malpractice of staff physicians whose original employment
applications were screened negligently or inadequately,4 even if the
physicians' negligent acts occurred several years after they were
hired.42 This attenuated liability is based on the assumption that
Wash. L. Rev. 385 (1975). The specific guidelines are not important under this duty as long as
they are reasonable and clearly established. Id. The type of guidelines and the manner in which
they are applied are crucial in assessing the nondelegable duties of supervision and selection. See
Parts III.A.3 and III.A.4.
35. The major cases of corporate liability that focus on the controversy and inconsistency
addressed by this Note do not involve failure to promulgate rules and regulations.
36. Perdue, 24 S. Tex. L. J. at 805-06 (cited in note 13).
37. See Parts III.A.3 and III.A.4.
38. For examples of cases discussing hospitals' duty to select their staff physicians properly,
see Purcell v. Zimbleman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335, 340 (1972); Joiner v. Mitchell County
Hoop. Auth., 125 Ga. App. 1, 186 S.E.2d 307, 308 (1971); Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 164. See also
Davenport, Note, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. at 466-72 (cited in note 24). See generally Perdue, 24 S. Tex.
L. J. at 792-99 (cited in note 13).
39. Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 164, 170; Purcell, 500 P.2d at 340; Joiner, 186 S.E.2d at 308-09.
See also Perdue, 24 S. Tex. L. J. at 792 (cited in note 13); Note, 11 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. at 580
(cited in note 11).
40. Perdue, 24 S. Tex. L. Rev. at 792 (cited in note 13); Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 170-71.
41. Note, 11 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. at 580 (cited in note 11). See also Joiner, 186 S.E.2d at
308; Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 169-71; Purcell, 500 P.2d at 341.
42. See, for example, Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 169-71. Hospitals have a duty to use
reasonable care in selecting physicians to their staffs. Id. A problem has arisen in defiming
reasonable care. The various standards used and the courts' disparate treatment of these
standards as proper indicators of negligence are discussed in Part V of this Note.
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hospitals are liable for placing doctors in positions to commit negligent
acts.4
The landmark case of Joiner v. Mitchell County Hospital
Authority4 4 squarely addressed this issue of direct hospital liability for
the negligent selection of a staff physician.45 Mrs. Joiner filed suit
against Dr. Gonzalez and against Mitchell County Hospital
Authority.4 She claimed that she brought her husband to the hospital
because he was suffering chest pain.4 7  She further alleged that Dr.
Gonzalez sent her husband home after determining that his condition
was not serious and did not require hospitalization. 48 Her husband's
condition worsened, and he subsequently died on the return journey to
the hospital after the previous visit.49 Mrs. Joiner claimed that the
hospital negligently selected the physician Gonzalez as a member of
its staff.5° Specifically, she claimed that the hospital was negligent in
failing to: (1) require adequate proof of the doctor's qualifications; (2)
investigate the doctor's qualifications, character, and background; and
(3) exercise care in determining his morality and professional
competence. 51 The lower court granted summary judgment for the
hospital, but the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the decision,52
stating that the hospital could not absolve itself of liability by con-
tending that the medical staff, and not the hospital, was responsible
for physician selection.5 Although the court did not determine
whether the defendant hospital was liable for negligently selecting Dr.
Gonzalez, the court opened the door for the application of a
nondelegable duty of physician selection.54
The court in Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hospital55
expanded and more fully articulated the nondelegable duty of the
43. Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 163-65, 170. See also I. Trotter Hardy, Jr., When Doctrines
Collide: Corporate Negligence and Respondeat Superior When Hospital Employees Fail to Speak
Up, 61 Tulane L. Rev. 85, 90-92 (1986).
44. 125 Ga. App. 1, 186 S.E.2d 307 (1971).
45. Id. As stated in the text accompanying note 155, staff physicians are independent
contractors. The Court, nonetheless, held the hospital liable for negligent selection even though
the patient did not claim vicarious liability for the doctor's actions. Joiner, 186 S.E.2d at 308.
46. Id. at 308.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 308-09.
51. Id. at 308.
52. Id. at 309.
53. Id. at 308-09.
54. Id. The court stated that the incompetence of the physician and the related negligence
of the hospital in selecting the physician were issues of fact for the jury to determine. Id. at 309.
55. 99 Wis. 2d 708, 301 N.W.2d 156 (1981).
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hospital to select staff physicians properly.m In Johnson, the jury
found that a staff physician acted negligently when he removed a pin
fragment from a patient's hip. 57  The court then found Misericordia
Community Hospital directly liable for the patient's injuries because
the hospital acted negligently when it selected this doctor to its staff.8
The hospital failed to investigate the physician's background when he
applied for staff privileges.59 If Misericordia Community Hospital had
inquired into Dr. Salinsky's background prior to hiring him, it would
have discovered readily available information about Salinsky's
questionable competence. 0
The court defined the hospital's duty of selection in terms of
foreseeability.61 The court stated that the hospital's failure to screen
prospective staff physicians' credentials gave rise to a foreseeable risk
of unreasonable harm to its patients.. 2 The hospital's failure to select
its medical staff carefully foreseeably increased the likelihood that the
selected physicians would be unqualified and subsequently would
commit negligent acts.6 3
The court held that the hospital's actual knowledge of Salin-
sky's incompetence was not required to prove negligence.64 Although
the plaintiff offered no evidence that the hospital knew of Dr.
Salinsky's incompetence when it selected him 6 5 the hospital was
charged with constructive knowledge of the doctor's professional
problems and poor reputation because it would have obtained this
information if it had conducted a proper selection inquiry using
ordinary care.6 6  The burden of proof, however, rests with the
56. Id. at 170-71. See generally Davenport, Note, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. at 466-72 (cited in note
24).
57. Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 157-58. The patient suffered permanent nerve damage as a
result of the surgery and was partially paralyzed. Id. at 158. The jury found that Dr. Salinsky
and the hospital were each 20% negligent. Id.
58. Id. at 174. Dr. Salinsky did not challenge the jury findings on appeal; the appellate
court focused solely on the hospital's liability for negligently selecting this doctor to be on its staff.
Id. at 158.
59. Id. at 159-61.
60. Id. at 160-62. The doctor had lied on his application, had a poor reputation among his
peers, and had been sued several times for malpractice.
61. Id. at 163-64.
62. Id. at 164. See Perdue, 24 S. Tex. L. J. at 794-95 (cited in note 13). See also Davenport,
Note, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. at 465-66 (cited in note 24).
63. Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 164-65. See Davenport, Note, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. at 465-66 (cited
in note 24).
64. Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 172. See Davenport, Note, 1983,Wis. L. Rev. at 468-69 (cited in
note 24).
65. Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 172-73.
66. Id. at 172-74. Misericordia Community Hospital did not contact the hospitals that
Salinsky referenced on his application. If it had, it would have discovered that this doctor never
had held the consultant privileges he claimed, that he was neither board certified nor eligible to
54319941
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:535
plaintiff, who must prove that the hospital possessed constructive
knowledge of the potential harm.6 7
Although the Johnson court articulated the modern duty of a
hospital to select its physicians properly, the court also defined
parameters and limits for hospital negligence based on improper
physician selection.68 The court stated that because the hospital
should not be the insurer of the medical staffs competence, a hospital
exercising reasonable care in selecting its staff will not be held
negligent under a theory of corporate liability for acts of staff
physician malpractice.69 When the hospital fails to comply with rea-
sonable standards of physician staff selection,70 however, courts
usually will find corporate liability for negligent selection.71  Recent
cases have distinguished between a hospital that fails to screen an
applicant at all 72 and a hospital that does not use reasonable care in
the screening process.73
Other courts also have limited corporate liability for negligent
selection. These courts have stated that a plaintiff must prove both
patient harm and physician negligence, even when hospital liability is
practice orthopedic surgery, that most of his peers thought he was unqualified as an orthopedic
surgeon, and that his staff privileges had been revoked at two hospitals and denied at another.
Id. at 173-74. If the hospital had checked the public court files, it would have seen that seven
malpractice suits were pending against him at the time it selected him. Id. at 174. See also
Davenport, Note, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. at 468-69 (cited in note 24).
67. See, for example, Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 527 Pa. 330, 591 A.2d 703, 708 (1991);
Purcell v. Zimbleman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335, 343 (1972). For all practical purposes, a
hospital will be held to possess constructive knowledge. The fact that a hospital is in the best
position to obtain information, coupled with the fact that the hospital has the resources and
incentives to obtain such information, is the basis for imposing constructive knowledge. A
hospital must have some opportunity to gain knowledge of the physician's incompetence before it
may be held liable for negligent selection. See Thompson, 591 A.2d at 707; Johnson, 301 N.W.2d
at 172.
68. Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 174-75.
69. Id. (emphasis added). See also Davenport, Note, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. at 469-70 (cited in
note 24).
70. The National Practitioner Data Bank regulations now require a hospital to check the
Data Bank for any prior occurrences of physician malpractice, licensure actions, or suspensions
from medical societies. See generally National Practitioner Data Bank for Adverse Information
on Physicians and Other Health Care Practitioners, 45 C.F.R. § 60.1-14 (revised Oct. 1992).
Accordingly, a hospital may fulfill its selection duty in certain circumstances through a proper
search of the Data Bank. See Part V.B of this Note for a discussion of the Data Bank and its
likely effect on the selection duty.
71. See Hardy, 61 Tulane L. Rev. at 90-91 (cited in note 43); Arthur F. Southwick, The
Hospital's New Responsibility, 17 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 146, 154 (1968); Susan B. Koehn, Note,
Hospital Corporate Liability: An Effective Solution to Controlling Private Physician
Incompetence?, 32 Rutgers L. Rev. 342, 360 (1979).
72. See, for example, Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 160-62, 170.
73. See, for example, Bell v. Sharp Cabrillo Hosp., 212 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 1047 (1989):
Elam, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
544
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based on a direct duty to the patient to select physicians adequately.74
The 1992 Alabama Supreme Court case of Humana Medical
Corporation of Alabama v. Traffanstedt,7 5 for example, discussed John-
son. and found that the doctor's negligence was an important factor in
finding the hospital liable.7c The Humana court used a quasi-
respondeat-superior analysis by holding that the jury could not find
the hospital liable without first finding the doctor negligent." This
holding is interesting in light of the fact that a hospital owes this duty
directly to the patient. From a practical standpoint, however, the
requirement that a patient show tangible harm to prove damages is
reasonable.78
Another court found that the hospital's negligence must be a
substantial factor in harming the patient. 9 Some courts also have
required a causal relationship between the negligent physician
selection and the subsequent patient harm ° The plaintiff may estab-
lish this connection by using the foreseeability doctrine.8' Courts
could construe the selection of a physician who is negligent as a
substantial factor that contributes to patient harm because the doctor
would not have been in a position to harm but for the initial negligent
selection.82 The courts have discretion regarding the application and
limitations of corporate liability for negligent selection. This judicial
74. See, for example, Humana Medical Corp. of Ala. v. Traffanstedt, 597 S.2d 667 (Ala.
1992) (citing Elam, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 156); Purcell, 500 P.2d at 342.
75. 597 S.2d 667 (Ala. 1992).
76. Id. at 669. The court stated that some act of physician negligence must occur before the
hospital can be held liable. Id. at 667.
77. Id. The court stated that the jury verdicts were 'inherently inconsistent" because the
jury found for the allegedly negligent physician's estate and against Humana Hospital. Id. If the
doctor was not negligent, then the hospital itself could not be negligent.
78. The plaintiff must prove a causal connection between the plaintiffs injuries and the
hospital's actions to prevail under even a corporate liablility claim. Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 158;
Purcell, 500 P.2d at 342.
79. Thompson, 591 A.2d at 708. See generally Judith M. Kinney, Comment, Tort
law-Expansion of Hospital Liability Under the Doctrine of "Corporate Negligence"--Thompson v.
Nason Hospital, 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991), 65 Temple L. Rev. 787 (1992).
80. Thompson 591 A.2d at 707-08. Fraker v. Waukesha Memorial Hosp., Inc., 165 Wis. 2d
392, 478 N.W.2d 67 (1991) (citing Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 164). See also Davenport, Note, 1983
Wis. L. Rev. at 456 n.14 (cited in note 24).
81. See text accompanying notes 61-63.
82. Although courts may articulate a substantial factor requirement, a court wishing to
impose corporate liability for negligent selection easily can show that the selection was a sub-
stantial factor. The causal connection also can be shown because it is foreseeable that if a hospital
negligently screens, or does not screen at all, then the selected physicians more likely will be
incompetent and, in turn, more likely to engage in malpractice. See Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 154.
83. Arguably, a proper Data Bank inquiry would eliminate judicial discretion if the
complaint alleges that the hospital should have checked into the physician's malpractice record or
licensure record. Courts still may look beyond the requirements, however, and hold the hospital
liable for any other selection-related information that the Data Bank does not mandate.
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discretion, however, creates confusion and uncertainty for hospital
administrators. Ultimately, a court that wants to impose corporate
liability' may do so with impunity by merely disregarding factors and
cases that limit liability and accentuating common-law duties or other
liberal cases that have found liability.85
4. Duty to Supervise Staff Physicians Properly
After the hospital has selected its staff physicians properly, it
has an ongoing duty and obligation to supervise each physician.M
This direct, nondelegable duty may be the most controversial
component of the corporate liability doctrine.87 Two factors complicate
courts' determinations of liability for breach of the duty to properly
supervise: physicians are independent contractors and negligent
supervision may be difficult to ascertain.88
The court in Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hos-
pital9 first recognized a hospital's responsibility for the quality of
medical care provided by the physicians on its staffY0 In Darling, the
Illinois Supreme Court held that a hospital's failure to review and
supervise its staff physicians could be construed as negligence?9
In Darling, the attending physician improperly treated a
patient who came into the emergency room with a broken leg.92 Be-
Therefore, courts still may hold hospitals liable for not obtaining information not provided in the
Data Bank.
84. See the justifications for corporate liability in Part ILI.B of this Note.
85. This discretion leaves room for a court to decide that the hospital should cover the costs
and then work backwards to justify this result. See, for example, Joiner v. Mitchell County Hosp.
Auth., 125 Ga. App. 1, 186 S.E.2d 307 (1971).
86. Elam v. College Park Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 342-44, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982);
Darling v. Charleston Comm. Memorial Hosp., 33 fl.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253, 257 (1965).
87. See Hardy, 61 Tulane L. Rev. at 91 (cited in note 43). For cases discussing this
supervisory duty, see generally Darling, 211 N.E.2d 253; Elam, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156; Tucson
Medical Center, Inc. v. Miseveh, 113 Ariz. 34, 545 P.2d 958 (1976); Purcell v. Zimbleman, 18 Ariz.
App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972).
88. See Perdue, 24 S. Tex. L. J. at 799-806 (cited in note 13). See generally Darling, 211
N.E.2d 253.
89. 33111. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
90. Id. at 257. The Darling case is one of the most famous cases in corporate liability.
Hospitals became increasingly concerned about their potential liability for the negligent acts of
their independent contractor staff physicians as a great amount of academic comentary followed
the Darling decision. See, for example, William M. Copeland, Hospital Responsibility for Basic
Care Provided by Medical Staff Members: "Am I My Brother's Keeper?" 5 N. Ky. L. Rev. 27 (1978);
Southwick, 9 Cal. W. L. Rev. at 429 (cited in note 1).
91. Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 257. See also Note, 11 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. at 569 (cited in note
11); Perdue, 24 S. Tex. L. J. at 785-89 (cited in note 13); Havighurst, Health Care Law and Policy
at 591-92 (cited in note 11).
92. In Darling, an eighteen-year-old boy was taken to the defendant hospital's emergency
room after he suffered a broken leg in a college football game. 211 N.E.2d at 255. A hospital staff
physician who was on call applied traction and put Darling's leg in a plaster cast. Id. Subse-
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cause of this mistreatment, the patient lost his leg.93 The court found
that the hospital was liable for negligent supervision on two grounds.94
First, the attending nurses did not test the circulation as often as
necessary and were unaware of the deteriorating color of Darling's
leg.95 Therefore, the nurses breached a direct duty to the patient by
alerting neither the attending physician nor the hospital authorities of
a problem of which they should have been aware.96 This first ground
of potential hospital liability was based on the doctrine of respondeat
superior because the nurses were employees and under the direct
control of the hospital.97 The second ground under which the court
found the hospital negligent was the hospital's failure to review the
attending physician's work or to require a consultation.98 Thus, the
court imposed direct liability on the hospital for negligent supervision
of its independent contractor physician staff.9
This second ground of potential negligence made the Darling
decision both novel and troubling to hospitals.' °° Since the Darling
court first addressed this issue, many courts have expanded and ex-
plained a hospital's duty to supervise its staff physicians properly. 1°o
The various holdings addressing a hospital's duty to supervise its staff
have examined the standards that courts should use when assessing
liability and have discussed when hospitals should be held to these
standards. 102 Unfortunately, some courts have imposed this
quently, Darling suffered great pain. Id. His toes, which protruded from the bottom of the cast,
became noticeably swollen and dark in complexion. Id. They later became cold and did not
respond when touched. Id. Three days later, the same physician removed the cast and, in the
process, cut both sides of the patient's leg. Id. See generally Havighurst, Health Care Law and
Policy at 587-92 (cited in note 11). Nurses and other witnesses observed 'blood and other
seepage" as well as a stench in the room. Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 255. Darling subsequently was
transferred to another hospital where a new doctor ultimately was forced to amputate the leg be-
low the knee because of considerable dead tissue caused by a prior constriction of circulation. Id.
at 255-56.
93. Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 255.
94. Id. at 258.
95. Id.
96. Id. See also Restatement (Second) of Agency § 229 (1958).
97. The hospital would be liable, unarguably, for the negligent acts of its employees once
the master-servant relationship was established and the act was deemed to have occurred within
the scope of employment. Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 257-58.
98. Id. at 258.
99. Id.
100. See Havighurst, Health Care Law and Policy at 591 (cited in note 11); Perdue, 24 S.
Tex. L. J. at 790 (cited in note 13). See generally H. Ward Classen, Hospital Liability for
Independent Contractors: Where Do We Go from Here?, 40 Ark. L. Rev. 469, 478-80 (1987).
101. See, for example, Pedroza v. Bryant, 101 Wash.2d 266, 677 P.2d 166, 168-70 (1984);
Purcell, 500 P.2d at 341; Tucson Medical Center, 545 P.2d at 960; Kitto v. Gilbert, 39 Colo. App.
374, 570 P.2d 544 (1977). For a more recent application of the duty to supervise, see Pancoast v.
Northeastern Hosp., Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS 6 (Common Pleas Ct.); Thompson, 591 A.2d 703.
102. See Part V of this Note.
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supervisory duty inconsistently.103 This discrepancy is understandable
given the difficulty of defining a hospital's supervisory duty, which
depends on the facts in a particular case as well as other factors.104 A
court's use and application of specific standards ultimately will
determine its finding of liability.
B. Justifications for the Imposition of Corporate Liability on Hospitals
Courts often offer justifications for the imposition of corporate
liability on hospitals for failure to meet these duties.'0 5 First, some
courts have explained that the expanded role of the modern hospital
increases its liability. Patients expect a modern hospital to address
their needs directly.106 This justification serves as the basic premise
for corporate liability.107 The weakness in this argument is that it
merely asserts that the hospital deserves the liablility and does not
provide any corresponding policy reasons to explain or justify why
courts should saddle hospitals with greater liability. Combined with
other rationales, however, the arguments that support imposing
greater liability on hospitals are more credible.oa
Another justification the courts have set forth is that imposing
corporate liability on hospitals provides the hospital with an added
incentive to select and supervise its staff physicians carefully.1°9 A
hospital is likely to examine its own activities more thoroughly
because it may be directly liable for harm to patients."0 The threat of
corporate liability is a useful and positive tool that gives hospitals
great incentives for self-monitoring and diligent, careful operation."'
103. See Part VI of this Note.
104. The mitigating factors that limit liability for physician selection also apply to the duty to
supervise. See notes 74-85 and accompanying text.
105. See, for example, Keith B. Hunter, Comment, Medical Malpractice by Emergency
Physicians and Potential Hospital Liability, 75 Ky. L. J. 633, 640 (1986) (citing Gregory G. Peters,
Reallocating Liability to Medical Staff Review Committee Members: A Response to the Hospital
Corporate Liability Doctrine, 10 Am. J. L. & Med. 115, 117 (1984)).
106. See Part II of this Note for a discussion of the role of the modern hospital as a corporate
institution.
107. See text accompanying note 23. See generally Johnson v. Misericordia Comm. Hosp., 99
Wis.2d 708, 301 N.W.2d 156, 164 (1981).
108. See notes 15-22 and acompanying text.
109. Elam, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 165. The court in Elam stated that "imposing the duty of care
upon a hospital should have the 'prophylactic' effect of supplying the hospital with a greater
incentive to assure the competence of its medical staff and the quality of medical care rendered
within its walls." Id. at 164. See also Hunter, Comment, 75 Ky. L. J. at 640 (cited in note 105);
Peters, 10 Am. J. L. & Med. at 117 (cited in note 105).
110. See Elam, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 164; Pedroza, 677 P.2d at 170.
111. Pedroza, 677 P.2d at 170. See also Elam, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 164; Peters, 10 Am. J. L. &
Med. at 121 (cited in note 105).
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The court in Pedroza v. Byrant,12 for example, stated that forcing
hospitals to be responsible for corporate negligence may provide them
with a financial incentive to ensure the quality of their staff physi-
cians.1 1 3 This cost-shifting approach, however, does not guard against
physician negligence adequately because hospitals do not know which
standards to follow to avoid liability.,1 4
A third justification that courts have articulated is that the
imposition of corporate liability provides an often-needed source of
compensation for the injured claimant." 5 Patients have an additional
avenue of relief available when hospitals are also directly liable to
patients." 6 This avenue may be the only method by which a claimant
can receive compensation. Although this deep-pocket theory departs
from the traditional fault-based tort system, some courts are attracted
to the practical, financial considerations." 7
A final justification that at least one court has articulated for
imposing corporate liability is that a hospital is in the best position to
monitor and control its staff physicians." 8 Professional practitioners
can be supervised most easily and most effectively from the site where
the medical care is administered." 9 The Pedroza court stated that a
hospital is the logical place to begin addressing problems of physician
incompetence. 20 The fact that a hospital may be in the best position
to monitor the staff physicians, however, does not necessarily mean
that the hospital automatically should be liable.
C. Criticisms of the Justifications
The courts' justifications for imposing corporate liability on
hospitals have met with criticism. A counter-argument to the
112. 101 Wash. 2d 226, 677 P.2d 166 (1984).
113. Id. at 170.
114. Hospitals receive liability without the ability to account for it, This Note argues that
corporate liablity only serves as an incentive if a hospital can follow specific standards to guard
against future exposure. Courts, however, have not given specific standards necessary to create a
true incentive for hospitals. See the discussion in Part VI of this Note.
115. See, for example, Pedroza, 677 P.2d at 169. Malpractice victims may be injured beyond
the negligent physician's ability to compensate through insurance or otherwise. Id.
116. Id. This avenue of relief is especially important if the negligent physician does not have
medical malpractice insurance. See James B. Cohoon, Comment, Piercing the Doctrine of
Corporate Hospital Liability, 17 San Diego L. Rev. 383, 393 n.64 (1980). The question is whether
this justification is appropriate or merely appealing when an injured victim can find no other
means of compensation.
117. Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 527 Pa. 330, 591 A.2d 703, 709 (1991) (Flaherty, J.,
dissenting). See also Kinney, Comment, 65 Temple L. Rev. at 796-77 (cited in note 79).
118. Pedroza, 677 P.2d at 169-70.
119 Id.
120. Id. at 170 (quoting Koehn, Note, 32 Rutgers L. Rev. at 376-77 (cited in note 71)).
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incentive justification is that the market provides more than an
adequate incentive to select competent physicians and supervise them
carefully. 121  Competition among hospitals often can be fierce, and
issues such as the loss of business from bad publicity serve as a great
incentive for a hospital to select and supervise its staff physicians
carefully. Courts that rely on this incentive justification thus use the
tort system to solve a problem that the free market could address
more properly.
Some critics have maligned the contention that corporate liabil-
ity provides the patient with an additional avenue of relief.122 They
argue that this justification focuses more on deep pockets than on
finding the appropriate tortfeasor.13 Traditional notions of tort
liability have emphasized the concept of fault-based liability, yet cor-
porate liability creates a quasi-strict liability system in which hospi-
tals serve as the ultimate insurers. 124 One judge, in fact, lambasted
the entire theory of corporate liability as overbroad and unneces-
sary. 12 5 The dissenting judge in the recent case of Thompson v. Nason
Hospital stated that corporate liability is a deep-pocket theory of
liability that places financial burdens on hospitals for the actions of
people, specifically independent contractor staff physicians, who are
not the hospital's employees. 26 The dissent implied that the tradi-
tional doctrine of respondeat superior was sufficient to protect claim-
ants and that imposing liability without a master-servant relationship
was an irresponsible search for a deep-pocket payor.'27 Although
courts should consider the liability doctrine's merits, justifications,
and corresponding criticisms carefully, the most important question is
how the judiciary should apply the standards that define the doctrine
and whether or not these standards are sufficiently clear and specific.
121. This is because the cost of greater liability would hamper a hospital's competitiveness
with respsect to other hospitals. Economists see incentives as playing a significant role in
hospital and physician decisionmaking. See Harold S. Luft, Economic Incentives and Clinical
Decisions, in Bradford H. Gray, ed., The New Healthcare for Profit: Doctors and Hospitals in a
Competitive Environment 103, 104-05 (National Academy, 1983).
122. Thompson, 591 A.2d at 709 (Flaherty, J., dissenting); Cohoon, Comment, 17 San Diego
L. Rev. at 400-01 n.106-07 (cited in note 116).
123. Cohoon, Comment, 17 San Diego L. Rev. at 400-01 n.106-07.
124. Although under corporate liability a hospital is not supposed to serve as an insurer, the
danger of this application is ever-present. See Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 174. See also Thompson,
591 A.2d at 709 (Flaherty, J., dissenting); David J. Slawkowski, Do the Courts Understand the
Realities of Hospital Practices, 22 S.L.U. L. Rev. 452, 465-68 (1978).
125. Thompson, 591 A.2d at 709 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
126. Id.
127. Id. Part IV of this Note discusses the evolution of hospital liability from charitable
immunity to corporate liability, as well as respondeat superior liability.
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IV. THE EVOLUTION OF HOSPITAL LIABILITY
Since the turn of the century, hospitals have faced increasing
liability for the acts of their staff physicians.12 8 Courts steadily have
imposed an increasing level of liability on hospitals that has
culminated in the doctrine of corporate liability. As discussed below,
the evolution of hospital liability has been anything but stagnant. At
one time, hosptials were exempt from liability under the charitable
immunity doctrine. Since then, courts have held hospitals vicariously
liable for acts of their employees under the respondeat superior and
the ostensible agency doctrines to protect for the protection of
reasonable patient expectations. Finally, courts have held hospitals
liable for the nondelegable hospital duties articulated in the corporate
liability doctrine.129
A. Charitable Immunity
Originally, courts treated hospitals exclusively as charitable
organizations, thus giving hospitals complete immunity from liability
based on the negligent acts of their staff doctors1 30 and other hospital
employees, such as nurses.' 3' Although some courts have made the
128. See generally Havighurst, Health Care Law and Policy at 581-87 (cited in note 11);
Perdue, 24 S. Tex. L. J. at 783-85 (cited in note 13); Note, 11 Win. Mitchell L. Rev. at 563-66 (cited
in note 11).
129. A threshold question remains as to whether courts will extend corporate liability to
third-party payors for improperly designing or administering a health-care plan. See generally
Wilson v. Blue Cross of Southern Cal., 222 Cal. App. 3d 660, 221 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. App. Ct.
1990), and Wickline v. California, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. App. Ct. 1986),
which together may raise the prospect of this extended liability.
130. Thompson, 591 A.2d at 706 (citing McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass.
432 (1876)). The general idea of charitable immunity is that an institution, often religious, should
not be exposed to liability when it serves as a charitable entity. See generally Note, 11 Win.
Mitchell. L. Rev. at 566-68 (cited in note 11). The doctrine of charitable immunity recognizes that
if an institution must account for tort liability, then it will no longer be able to provide care to all
without regard for their ability to pay. See generally Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp.,
211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914). Tort doctrine in general, and hospital liability doctrine
specifically, has come to reject this idea. See, for example, Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143
N.E.2d 3, 8 (1957) (stating that those who administer the public good still must be careful). In the
hospital arena, the changing status of the hospital has played a significant role in the
corresponding change in its liability. See, for example, Darling v. Charleston Comm. Memorial
Hosp., 33 Ill.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253, 257 (1965) (citing Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 8).
The fact that hospitals later argued that doctors were independent contractors did not enter
into the decision-making process regarding hospital liability for physicians under the charitable
immunity doctrine. The lack of employee status only became a battle cry after the courts began to
impose vicarious liability on the hospitals under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
131. See, for example, Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93. Again, the immunity from liability was
based not on the lack of hospital control over an independent contractor versus an employee but
on the hospital's status as a charitable entity. Id.
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distinction that physicians are licensed to practice medicine while
hospitals are not,13 the landmark case of Schloendorff v. Society of
New York Hospital3l stated that a hospital's status as a charitable
organization insulates it from the negligent acts of doctors and
nurses.134  Judge Cardozo further explained that a charitable
hospital 35 should not be liable for the negligent acts of its doctors and
nurses because this kind of institution benefits society. 136 The court
viewed practitioners as the actual providers of medical care while
considering hospitals to be the mere facilities for that care. 137  The
Schloendorff court also determined that the hospital was not in a
master-servant relationship with the staff physicians. 38
B. The Move Toward Respondeat Superior-Bridging the Gap Until
Bing v. Thunig Brings Vicarious Liability to Hospitals
During the next forty years, charitable immunity continued to
shield hospitals from any liability to their patients. Consequently,
some courts applied a "captain of the ship" doctrine 39 in an effort to
provide patients who had justifiable claims with at least some com-
pensation.40 Using this doctrine, courts could find a physician liable
for the negligence of nurses under the premise that the physician is
the "captain of the ship" and should take ultimate responsibility for
the patients' welfare.' 41 Although most modern courts have rejected
this doctrine,4 courts began to use the doctrine of respondeat superior
to provide at least some compensation to patients with valid claims.'4
132. See the discussion in Bernardi v. Community Hosp. Assoc., 166 Colo. 280, 443 P.2d 708,
711-13 (1968) (discussing Schloendorffand other cases).
133. 221 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
134. Id. at 93.
135. Unlike many modern hospitals, the hospital in Schloendorff was not operated for profit.
Id. at 92.
136. Id. at 93. See also Thompson, 591 A.2d at 706 (citing Forrest v. Red Cross Hosp., 265
S.W.2d 80 (Ky. 1954), overruled by Mullikin v. Jewish Hosp. Ass'n of Louisville, 348 S.W.2d 930
(Ky. 1961)).
137. Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93. The court viewed the physician as independent of the
hospital and thus did not charge the hospital with liability for the negligence of the physician.
138. Id. at 93-94.
139. See McConnell v. Williams, 361 Pa. 355, 365 A.2d 243, 246 (1949). For an explanation of
the borrowed servant doctrine, see Restatement (Second) of Agency § 227 (1958). This doctrine
served to bridge the gap between charitable immunity and respondeat superior. See Havighurst,
Health Care Law and Policy at 585-86 n.1 (cited in note 11).
140. See Havighurst, Health Care Law and Policy at 585-86 n.1 (cited in note 11).
141. McConnell, 65 A.2d at 248.
142. See, for example, Sparger v. Worley Hosp., Inc., 547 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1977).
143. See, for example, Note, 11 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. at 570 (cited in note 11). See also
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 2 (1958). The doctrine of respondeat superior holds an
employer vicariously liable for the negligent acts of an employee. Id. The actual fault of the
employee is not imputed to the employer, but the liability itself is imputed to the employer. Id.
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Forty years after the charitable immunity decision in Schloen-
dorff,14 4 the court in Bing v. Thunig'4 5 applied the doctrine of respon-
deat superior to hospitals.146 The Bing court expressly abandoned the
prior ruling in Schloendorff that essentially exempted hospitals from
the doctrine of respondeat superior. 147 The court in Bing rejected the
prior distinction between administrative and medical acts that courts
had considered when determining whether a hospital was liable for
negligence.'4 It found that courts used this arbitrary distinction
merely to exempt hospitals from respondeat superior.149 It also held
that hospitals should be subject to the same standards as all other
employers' 5 and should face vicarious liability for the negligent acts of
their employees.151 Thus, the court promulgated changes in hospital
liability to correspond with the changes in the operation of modern
hospitals.15 2 It stated that the test for liability should be whether an
employer-employee relationship existed and whether the employee
committed the negligent act within the scope of employment.'
Following Bing, courts and commentators have expressed
sound reasons for holding hospitals liable under respondeat supe-
rior.' 4 Nevertheless, courts still could not hold hospitals liable for the
negligent acts of their staff physicians, who usually were classified as
independent contractors, 55 because the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior does not apply to independent contractors.'- Courts recognized
144. Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93-94.
145. 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957).
146. Id. at 8-9.
147. Id.
148. Id. The court in Schloendorff had articulated a somewhat unclear rule. A nurse who
filled out paperwork, an administrative act, could bring liability on the hospital for her negligent
act. Conversely, a nurse providing medical care could not cause liability for the hospital because
of the charitable immunity doctrine. Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 8-9.
149. Id. at 3.4.
150. Id. at 9. The court stated that following Schloendorff, a body of law developed that
exempted hospitals from the "normal operation of the doctrine of respondeat superior." Bing, 143
N.E.2d at 3.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. (finding no reason to continue hospitals' exemption from the otherwise universal rule
of respondeat superior). See generally Restatement (Second) of Agency § 2 (1958). See also id. §§
228-29 (defining scope of employment).
154. See Arthur F. Southwick, Hospital Liability: Two Theories Have Been Merged, 4 J.
Legal Med. 1, 4 (1983). See also Hunter, Comment, 75 Ky. L. J. at 636-38 (cited in note 105).
155. See Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 2, 220. See also Classen, 40 Ark. L. Rev. at 472
(cited in note 100).
156. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 409-442 (1966). See generally Restatement
(Second) of Agency §§ 2, 220 (1958). The necessary element of control is not present with an
independent contractor because an independent contractor is defined as a non-servant. Id.
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this limitation and thus attempted to expand hospital liability even
further to fill this gap.
C. Ostensible Agency Pushes Hospital Liability into the Staff
Physician Arena
Courts next imposed the doctrine of ostensible agency on hospi-
tals. Under this doctrine, a hospital may be liable for the negligent
acts of independent contractor staff physicians. 57 Courts base this
liability not on any actual employer-employee realtionship,'5 but on
patients' reasonable expectations that their treating physicians are
hospital employees. 59 By focusing on patients' reliance, courts found a
way to expand hospital liability and still adhere to recognized agency
doctrine. 160
Under the theory of ostensible agency, courts require the pa-
tient to prove certain elements to trigger hospital liability.rl The
court in Grewe v. Mount Clemens General Hospital enumerated three
elements that a patient must establish.162 First, the patient must
have relied on the belief that the physician was acting under the
direct authority of the hospital. 63  Second, the patient's belief must
have been caused by the hospital's negligent act. 64 Third, the patient
must not be guilty of contributory negligence.165  These required
elements limit the potentially unfettered liability that otherwise is
determined entirely from the patient's perspective. 6
157. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 267 (1965). See also Havighurst, Health Care
Law and Policy at 596-99 (cited in note 11); Note, 11 Win. Mitchell L. Rev. at 573-76 (cited in note
11).
158. An employer-employee relationship and the event at issue occurring within the scope of
employment-are required for the imposition of liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 228-29 (1958). See also Classen, 40 Ark. L. Rev. at 472-74
(cited in note 100).
159. Grewe v. Aft. Clemens General Hosp., 404 ich. 240, 273 N.W.2d 429, 433-34 (1978).
The hospital is imputed to have held out the doctor as an employee. See also Classen, 40 Ark. L.
Rev. at 487 n.93 (cited in note 100) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 267).
160. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 267 (1965).
161. Grewe, 273 N.W.2d at 433. See also Note, 11 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. at 573-74 (cited in
note 11).
162. Grewe, 273 N.W.2d at 434 (quoting Stanhope v. Los Angeles College of Chiropractic, 54
Cal. App. 2d 141, 128 P.2d 705, 708 (1942)). Grewe is a frequently cited case showing the applica-
tion of the ostensible agency doctrine
163. Grewe, 273 N.W.2d at 434.
164. Id.
165. Id. The patient must not have known or had a reasonable opportunity to discover that
the doctor was not a hospital employee. A patient's negligence undercuts the reasonableness of
her reliance.
166. See id. at 433-34. The court stated that "Itihe relationship between a given physician
and a hospital may well be that of an independent contractor performing services for . . . the
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Other courts will not apply the ostensible agency doctrine when
the hospital did not hold itself out in a way that created reasonable
reliance by the patient.167 Although courts have limited their use of
the ostensible agency doctrine appropriately, they have nonetheless
used this doctrine to further expand hospital liability68 by applying
accepted agency principles to the hosptial arena. 69
By turning to corporate liability, courts have imposed yet an-
other layer of liability on hospitals: direct liability for the negligent
selection and supervision of staff physicians.170 When determining
corporate liability, courts should examine the appropriate standards
and apply them consistently to provide reasonable and clear
parameters to lessen what could become overwhelming liability for
hospitals.
V. THE STANDARDS-WHERE COURTS MAY LOOK FOR AN INITIAL
DETERMINATION OF CORPORATE LIABILITY
Courts use objective standards to determine potential hospital
negligence under the corporate liability doctrine. These standards,
which define the scope and extent of potential liability for hospitals,
have evolved as hospitals have become modern corporations.' 7 1 Courts
can find these standards in state statutes, state regulations, and
guidelines promulgated by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), which probably are the most
influential.172 Although the type of standard that courts apply
ultimately may be of little importance, courts should apply the same
set of standards and choose these standards consistently.
hospital. However, that is not of critical importance to the patient who is the ultimate victim of
the physician's malpractice." Id.
167. See, for example, Revitzer v. Trenton Medical Center, Inc., 118 Mich. App. 169, 324
N.W.2d 561, 563 (1982). See also Note, 11 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. at 572-76 (cited in note 11).
168. See Theodore I. Kaskoff and Thomas L. Nadeau, Hospital Liability: The Emerging
Standard of Care, 48 Conn. Bar J. 305, 310 (1974). See also Havighurst, Health Care Law and
Policy at 596-98 (cited in note 11).
169. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 267 (1965). Respondeat superior and ostensible
agency are accepted agency doctrines.
170. See Parts III.A.3 and III.A.4 of this Note.
171. See, for example, Perdue, 24 S. Tex. L. J. at 776-78 (cited in note 13).
172 See note 7.
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A. The JCAHO Guidelines
The JCAHO was organized in 1952 by the American Medical
Association, the American College of Physicians, and the American
Hospital Association. 173 It has two express goals: to improve overall
patient care and to establish minimum standards that hospitals must
follow to receive accreditation. 74 The Commission publishes and
updates these standards annually in the JCAHO Accreditation
Manual for Hospitals (AMH), which provides hospitals with general
guidelines. 175 Although JCAHO hospital accreditation is voluntary,
most hospitals seek this status by complying with the guidelines 76
because of concerns like the fierce competition in today's marketplace.
Thus, JCAHO accreditation is vitally important to a hospital's
economic viability.' 71
The JCAHO guidelines require a hospital to structure itself as
an organized governing body with persons responsible for creating
policy, ensuring quality care, and establishing internal management
and planning.171 The hospital governing body, in turn, must adopt
bylaws with regard to its legal accountability and responsibility to its
patients.1 79 The JCAHO guidelines require a hospital governing body
to develop rules and bylaws for physician staff selection 8° and super-
vision.'81 These guidelines also require a hospital to have a single
organized medical staff responsible for the quality of the professional
services, which must report their findings to the governing body. 82
Although the hospital's governing body establishes rules and regula-
tions for the medical staff, the governing body does not have the ulti-
mate authority; a hospital's staff physicians are not truly subordinate
173. Perdue, 24 S. Tex. L. J. at 776-77 (cited in note 13).
174. C. Nesley Eisele, The Medical Staff in the Modern Hospital 181 (Houghton Mifflin,
1987).
175. See 1 JCAHO's Accreditation Manual for Hospitals (AMH) (1984). See generally Eisele,
Medical Staff at 180-86. See also Perdue, 24 S. Tex. L. J. at 776-77 (cited in note 13).
176. Perdue, 24 S. Tex. L. J. at 777 (cited in note 13). See also Cohoon, Comment, 17 San
Diego L. Rev. at 383-84 n.2 (cited in note 116).
177. From a competitive standpoint, JCAHO accreditation is almost mandatory. A non-
accredited hospital would have a difficult time competing for the health care dollar. According to
recent American Hospital Association statistics, nearly five out of every six hospitals is accredited
by the JCAHO. See 1992 AHA Hospital Statistics at 202 (reporting that 5114 out of 6634
hospitals are accredited). Hospitals must seek accreditation in order to qualify for medicare and
medicaid reimbursement. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb (1988 & Supp. 1991).
178. JCAHO's Accreditation Manual for Hospitals, GB.I., at 113 (1994).
179. Id. GB.1.13 at 115.
180. Id.
181. Id. GB.1.15, 1.17, 1.19, at 115.
182. JCAH's Accreditation Manual for Hospitals/88 MS.1 at 115 (1988).
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to the governing body.1as For example, the governing body can fire a
staff physician only if other staff physicians initiate the ousting and
only after consultation with the medical staff.184 Thus, the JCAHO
guidelines and the corresponding exposure to corporate liability for the
failure to supervise their staff physicians adequately limit hospital
administrators' freedom. 15 The governing body has the ultimate,
legal responsibility for its staff physicians, but it must defer to
physician autonomy to satisfy the JCAHO guidelines, which are
virtually necessary to run a successful and profitable hospital.1'
Thus, the JCAHO should amend the guidelines to provide specifically
for greater governing body authority.
Although the JCAHO guidelines mandate that hospitals must
comply with certain broad organizational requirements, they inten-
tionally do not require specific ways for hospitals to fulfill these re-
quirements. In particular, the guidelines do not specify the exact
manner in which a hospital must select or supervise its physicians. 117
In fact, in the 1993 version of the guidelines, the JCAHO reduced the
amount and extent of specific requirements that hospitals must
followas in an effort to respect hospital autonomy and recognize the
geographical and cultural diversity among hospitals throughout the
183. Kirt Darr and Jonathon S. Rakich, eds., Hospital Organization and Management 8-10
(National Health, 4th ed. 1989). See also Basil S. Georgopoulos and Floyd C. Mann, The Hospital
as an Organization, in Darr and Rakich, eds., Hospital Organization and Management at 29.
Vanderbilt University School of Law Professor James F. Blumstein analogized the situation to a
university, in which tenured professors work within the university framework but are not
technically bound by most university decisions regarding curriculum and teaching procedures.
184. Darr and Rakich, eds., Hospital Organization and Management at 8-10 (cited in note
183) (discussing the power and independence of the medical staff). See generally Patrick v.
Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988), for the problems that this may cause relating to physician reluctance
to initiate disciplinary proceedings against other physicians because of a fear of an antitrust
action. See also Alex M. Clark, Counseling on Medical Staff Issues, in M. Elizabeth Gee, ed.,
Antitrust Health Care Enforcement and Analysis 255 (ABA, 1992). The result is that hospitals
have no ability to remove negligent doctors because they may do so only after the staff physicians
have acted. Darr and Rakich, eds., Hospital Organization and Management at 13-15 (cited in
note 183) (recognizing that hospitals are gaining a greater degree of control).
185. Darr and Rakich, eds., Hospital Organization and Management at 9-10 (cited in note
183). Some commentators have argued that hospitals should have the needed control over their
medical staff to go along with their increasing liability exposure. See, for example, Kinney,
Comment, 65 Temple L. Rev. at 798 n.97 (cited in note 79).
186. Clark, Counseling on Medical Staff Issues at 237-39 (cited in note 184). The physicians
provide the patients; therefore, hospitals are careful to tread lightly on physician autonomy. As a
result, hospital governing bodies now have little control over the physician staff despite their
ultimate, legal responsibility. The rules of the medical staff are adopted by the medical staff
itself, and are merely approved by the governing body. See Havighurst, Health Care Law and
Policy at 551 (cited in note 11) (citing JCAHO Guideline MS.2.1 (1988)).
187. See generally 2 JCAHO,AMHat vxii-xiv (cited in note 175).
188. Id. at xi-xii.
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country.18 9 A more specific set of standards, however, would allow
courts to apply these standards more evenly and consistently and
would allow modern hospitals to protect themselves against future
liability.
B. The National Practitioner Data Bank
To reduce the overall risk of malpractice, the United States
Department of Health and Human Services recently promulgated
regulations establishing a National Practitioner Data Bank (Data
Bank) for the purpose of documenting events of medical malpractice
and physician incompetence on a national level.19° Any entity making
a payment in settlement of a malpractice claim must report the
circumstances of the payment to the Data Bank. 19' The Data Bank
regulations also require state licensing boards to report any
disciplinary actions 9 2 and any adverse clinical actions taken against a
health-care provider. 93
The Data Bank regulations require a hospital to check for prior
malpractice events and adverse licensing proceedings against any
physician that a hospital is considering for its staff.19 4 A hospital is
presumed to have constructive knowledge of any information available
in the Data Bank. 195 A hospital that properly checks the Data Bank
may rely on the obtained information without future liability,96
essentially creating a per se defense to negligent selection liability
when a plaintiff later claims that the hospital neglected to check the
Data Bank when selecting a physician to its staff.17 Even if courts
189. Id. at xiii.
190. National Practitioner Data Bank for Adverse Information on Physicians and Other
Health Care Practitioners, 45 C.F.R. § 60.7 (1992). These regulations were promulgated by the
Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3784 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (1988 & Supp. 1993)). These regulations were first
promulgated in September of 1991 and were amended most recently on October 1, 1992. See also
HHS, Division of Quality Assurance and Liability Management, National Practitioner Data Bank
Guide Book 1-3 (U.S. G.P.O., 1990). Until the advent of the Data Bank, the resources for
collecting data on individual physicians were the Federation of State Licensing Boards and the
AMA's Masterfile. Neither resource provided the comprehensive coverage envisioned by the Data
Bank. See Havighurst, Health Care Law and Policy at 402-03 (cited in note 11).
191. 45 C.F.R. § 60.7 (1992).
192. 45 C.F.R. § 60.8 (1992).
193. 45 C.F.R. § 60.9 (1992).
194. 45 C.F.R. § 60.10(a)(1) (1992). Additionally, hospitals must check the Data Bank every
two years thereafter. 45 C.F.R. § 60.10(a)(2) (1992).
195. 45 C.F.R. § 60.10(b) (1992).
196. A hospital will not be liable for relying on the information unless it knew the informa-
tion was false. 45 C.F.R. § 60.10(c) (1992).
197. This per se defense likely would cover many of the claims in Johnson v. Misericordia
Community Hospital because the physician's prior malpractice events would have been recorded
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enforce this Data Bank requirement, 9  however, they still may hold
hospitals liable for negligent selection based on criteria and informa-
tion not included in the Data Bank. For example, a physician's poor
references or questionable educational background may influence a
court's determination of whether a hospital is liable for negligent
selection. 199 Thus, checking the Data Bank only provides a defense for
a hospital if the alleged negligence refers to a physician's prior
malpractice or adverse licensure events. Therefore, the guidelines still
need further comprehensive and well-defined selection criteria.
VI. AN UNEVEN APPLICATION OF STANDARDS IN IMPOSING
CORPORATE LIABILITY
When determining corporate liability for negligent physician
selection and supervision, courts have relied on different standards
and have imposed varying degrees of hospital duties. Unfortunately,
courts have assessed hospital liability inconsistently, which has placed
hospitals in a difficult and precarious situation because even diligent
administrators realistically cannot determine whether their decisions
regarding physician selection and supervision will result in corporate
liability. Nor can a hospital administrator know what proactive steps
to take to protect the hospital from liability. If a hospital is too careful
in its physician selection or supervision, the hospital may face liability
from the doctors who are denied staff privileges and who assert that
the hospital acted improperly in deciding to deny or suspend
privileges.200
A. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital: The
Application of Objective Standards in the Grandfather of Hospital
Corporate Liability
Courts have examined a variety of standards when determin-
ing whether a hospital has breached its duty to patients to properly
in the Data Bank and would have been available to the hospital. At that time, however, no data
bank was available. See text accompanying notes 58-60.
198. See 45 C.F.R. § 60.10(a) (1992) (specifying what information hospitals are required to
request from the Data Bank).
199. See, for example, Joiner v. Mitchell County Hosp. Auth., 125 Ga. App. 1, 186 S.E.2d 387
(1971).
200. A large portion of health-care law is devoted to hospital antitrust issues. This Note does
not explore the issue of peer review in conjunction with antitrust concerns. For an example of a
case discussing these antitrust concerns, see Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988).
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select and supervise staff physicians.201 These courts have required
varying degrees of compliance with a constantly fluctuating set of
standards;2°2 thus they fail to provide clear guidelines for hospitals to
follow to avoid corporate liability.
In addition to finding a duty to supervise staff physicians prop-
erly, °2 3 the Darling court relied not on customary community stan-
dards but on objective regulations, standards, and bylaws to establish
the duty.204  Although Darling appeared to set the stage for future,
strict judicial reliance on objective criteria in determining corporate
liability,2°5 this trend did not occur. The court ultimately treated
objective standards the same as custom, finding that neither could
prove negligence conclusively.20 By refusing to relinquish any judicial
control in favor of more uniform and predictable guidelines, 207 the
201. See generally Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 527 Pa. 330,591 A.2d 703 (1991); 591 A.2d 703;
Bell, 260 Cal. Rptr. 886; Darling v. Charleston Comm. Memorial Hosp., 33 IU.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d
253 (1965); Joiner v. Mitchell County Hosp. Auth., 125 Ga. App. 1, 186 S.E.2d 307 (1971); Gonzales
v. Nork, 60 Cal. App. 3d 835, 131 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1976); Johnson, 301 N.W.2d 156; Pedroza v.
Bryant, 101 Wash.2d 266, 677 P.2d 166 (1984); Elam v. College Park Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332,
183 Ca. Rptr. 156 (1982); Purcell v. Zimbleman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972); Van Iperen
v. Van Bramer, 392 N.W.2d 480 (Iowa 1986); Sheffield v. Zilis, 170 Ga. App. 62, 316 S.E.2d 493
(1984).
202. See Part VI.B of this Note
203. See notes 89-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of this portion of the court's
holding.
204. Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 255-56. See also Havighurst, Health Care Law and Policy at 591
(cited in note 11).
205. The objective criteria on which the court potentially could rely included the Illinois
regulations, the JCAHO standards, and the hospital bylaws that were promulgated in conformity
with JCAHO standards.
206. Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 256.
207. Id. Some courts have held that mere licensing is enough, and others have stated that
adherence to JCAHO guidelines is required. See the discussion in note 216 and accompanying
text. Other courts have held that adherence to JCAHO guidelines is insufficient. See, for
example, the discussion of the Gonzalez case in notes 220-26 and accompanying text. These
different court holdings show the disparate treatment that courts have given to corporate liability
cases.
The court in Darling pointed to universal, objective standards while simultaneously cham-
pioning ultimate judicial discretion. The court quoted Learned Hand: 'Indeed in most cases
reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never its measure; a whole
calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices. It never may set its
own tests, however persuasive be its usages. Courts must in the end say what is required; there
are precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse their omission."
Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 257 (quoting The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932)) (emphasis
added). Under the court's reasoning, any court may override even established objective standards
of corporate liability. Accordingly, a hospital administrator who complies with recognized
standards will nonetheless be subject to potential liability. Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 258. A hospital
will not have an incentive to comply with established standards if the courts refuse to recognize
these standards.
Thus, although Darling recognized that objective standards are important tools for courts to
use in determining corporate liability, it left the door open for future courts to second-guess these
standards and to impose standards of their own. As one commentator aptly stated, "[t]he fertile
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Darling court set the stage for a long line of cases that have assessed
corporate liability inconsistently.
B. The Progeny of Darling
In Joiner v. Mitchell County Hospital Authority,2°8 the Georgia
Court of Appeals rejected the defendant hospital's claim that com-
pliance with Georgia law regarding licensing and references should
absolve it of any liability for negligent selection. 209 The court rejected
specific, objective standards as being dispositive and stated that al-
though the selected physician was licensed by the state and was rec-
ommended by other doctors on the staff, the selecting hospital still
could be held liable for the physician's future negligence under a
corporate liability theory.20  Thus, hospital administrators that
comply with state laws on physician selection must hold their breath
and hope that an appellate court does not determine, in its "expert"
opinion, that their hospitals should have exercised greater diligence in
the selection process. Without knowing what standards to follow,
hospitals have no way to protect themselves from potentially great
exposure for the future acts of their carefully hired staff physicians.
The courts in Darling and Joiner did not examine the JCAHO
or similar provisions to assess a breach of duty. Later courts have
considered hospital compliance with JCAHO standards when
determining corporate liability. 211  In Pedroza v. Byrant, -21 2 the
Washington Supreme Court applied JCAHO accreditation standards
to determine a hospital's corporate liability.2 3 The court apparently
found that a hospital's breach of the JCAHO guidelines amounted to
per se negligence; thus, courts could look to the specific JCAHO
guidelines to determine whether a hospital breached a corporate
ground first plowed by Darling is now growing a most diverse and hearty crop." Perdue, 24 S.
Tex. L. J. at 788 (cited in note 13).
If Darling had not left the judicial door open so wide, then perhaps subsequent courts would
have looked for established criteria that give hospital administrators the opportunity to protect
themselves through compliance with the set standards.
208. 125 Ga. App. 1, 186 S.E.2d 307 (1971). See notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
209. Joiner, 186 S.E.2d at 308. The later case of Purcell, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335,
cited Joiner and stated that state licensing and peer recommendations were not enough to shield
the hospital from liability.
210. Joiner, 186 S.E.2d at 308. The court did not refer specifically to "corporate liability," but
it clearly was referring to the doctrine.
211. See, for example, Van Iperen v. Van Bramer, 392 N.W.2d 480 (Iowa 1986); Pedroza, 677
P.2d 166; Sheffield v. Zilis, 170 Ga. App. 62, 316 S.E.2d 493 (1984); Gonzales v. Nork, 60 Cal. App.
3d 835, 131 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1976).
212. 101 Wash.2d 266, 677 P.2d 166 (1984).
213. Id. at 171.
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duty.2 1 4 Hospitals could comply with these standards, minimizing the
potentially unlimited liability that a patient-sympathetic court could
impose on even the most diligent hospital.
By focusing on objective standards, the Pedroza court moved in
the right direction, but in doing so, it inadvertently emphasized a
problem with the guidelines themselves from a corporate liability
standpoint: courts cannot rely on the guidelines because they are too
imprecise.215  For courts to apply the JCAHO guidelines as the
standard for corporate liability,216 the guidelines must provide specific
and thorough criteria. The court in Pedroza failed to address this
issue.
Wisely, the court in Pedroza equated JCAHO accreditation to
full compliance with hospital corporate liability duties. 217  The court
stated that the JCAHO standards, along with the hospital bylaws
adopted pursuant to these standards, constituted the standard of care
that the hospital must follow. 2 8  The resulting problem is that
although courts may apply these JCAHO guidelines strictly, the
guidelines are too imprecise to provide consistent and comprehensive
direction for hospital administrators. If all courts relied on these
standards and if the standards were specific and comprehensive, then
hospitals could focus squarely on compliance, thereby obviating their
potential corporate liability exposure. Although the court in Pedroza
did not go far enough to address the shortcomings of the guidelines, it
nevertheless made the important decision to apply one set of uniform,
national standards.219 Unfortunately, courts throughout the country
have not followed the Pedroza holding in this regard.
In Gonzalez v. Nork,220 the Superior Court of California stated
that hospital compliance with JCAHO standards alone was insuffi-
cient to insulate the hospital from corporate liability for negligent
214. The court decided to adopt the doctrine of corporate negligence but did not reverse
summary judgment against the plaintiff because the malpractice occurred entirely outside the
hospital. Id. Mrs. Pedroza was treated in the physician's private office; the hospital was not
involved. The court held that a "hospital's duty of care under the doctrine of corporate negligence
extends only to those who are patients within the hospital." Id. at 172.
215. Id. at 169-71.
216. The JCAHO guidelines should serve as the standard. As previously stated, however,
the Joint Commission must amend the guidelines to address the corporate liability problem more
specifically.
217. Pedroza, 677 P.2d at 170-71.
218. Id. The court cited Koehn, Note, 32 Rutgers L. Rev. at 376-77 (cited in note 71), for this
proposition.
219. Pedroza, 677 P.2d at 166.
220. 60 Cal. App. 3d 835, 131 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1976). See also Perdue, 24 S. Tex. L. J. at 801
(cited in note 13) (citing Gonzalez v. Nork, No. 228566C Sacramento Super. (Nov. 27, 1973), rev'd,
60 Cal. App. 3d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1976)).
562 [Vol. 47:535
HOSPITAL LIABILITY
selection.22,1 Gonzalez, contrary Pedroza, scrutinized the JCAHO
standards2 2 and found them deficient because of their vagueness.2 23
The court in Gonzalez, like the court in Darling, again quoted Learned
Hand, who said that courts ultimately must decide what constitutes
negligence regardless of any defined standards.2 24  The court in
Gonzalez held that courts must make the final determination
regarding negligence and that hospital compliance with standards
may not be enough to escape a separate judicial determination of
corporate liability.225 This decision leaves hospitals at the mercy of
judicial hindsight, facing liability regardless of compliance with
national industry standards. Because courts have treated compliance
with JCAHO standards inconsistently, hospitals must hope that the
particular court in which they appear does not ignore these accepted
standards and impose corporate liability despite the hospital's actual
compliance with industry guidelines. 2 6
Other courts also have treated the corporate liability standards
inconsistently. In a case decided after both Pedroza and Gonzalez, the
Iowa court in Van Iperen v. Van Bramer227 also found that a hospital's
compliance with JCAHO standards, or in this case lack of compliance,
was not dispositive of liability.2 18 The court's holding resembled the
Gonzalez court's decision in that both recognized that the JCAHO
standards are not self-authenticating.229 In Van Iperen, however, the
court upheld the directed verdict for the defendant hospital despite
possible non-compliance with JCAHO standards.230  Although the
court recognized that JCAHO standards may provide some evidence of
221. Perdue, 24 S. Tex. L. J. at 801. Defendant Dr. John Nork appealed from a $3.7 million
judgment for the plaintiff. Gonzales, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 718. Mercy Hospital, a co-defendant, did
not appeal the judgment. Id. at 718 n.1.
222. At the time of the decision, the standards were known as the JCAH standards.
223. Perdue, 24 S. Tex. L. J. at 802 (cited in note 13). The court recognized deficiencies in
the standards but did not propose any remedial measures. Id.
224. Id. at 802-03.
225. Perdue, 24 S. Tex. L. J. at 802 (cited in note 13).
226. The JCAHO guidelines may be considered equivalent to industry guidelines.
227. 392 N.W.2d 480 (Iowa 1986). Plaintiffs appealed from a lower court judgment in a
medical malpractice case. The district court directed a verdict for the defendant, St. Luke's
Regional Medical Center. Id. at 481.
228. Id. at 485-86. The Iowa Supreme Court upheld a district court's directed verdict in
favor of the defendant hospital even though the hospital's procedures may not have met the
relevant JCAHO standards. Id.
229. Id. at 486. The court stated: 'We do not believe the scope and application of the written
accreditation standards upon which plaintiff relies are sufficiently clear that these documents are
self-authenticating with respect to the required standard of care." Id.
230. Id.
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the proper standard of care, the court declined to apply the standards
exclusively when assessing the hospital's corporate liability. 31
Thus, in some cases a hospital may comply with the guidelines
but still incur liability, while in other cases a hospital may violate the
guidelines but still prevail.232 This inconsistency allows for judicial
second-guessing while it reduces a hospital's realistic opportunity to
protect itself through JCAHO guideline compliance. Despite the
difficulties that these inconsistent holdings impose on hospitals with
respect to their ability to minimize exposure, hospitals could attempt
to avoid exposure to liability if all court holdings were consistently
unreasonable. Nevertheless courts sometimes hold that compliance
with JCAHO, or other, guidelines constitutes complete protection from
corporate liability and sometimes they do not. Hospitals are left
uncertain and exposed.
The Georgia Court of Appeals in Sheffield v. Zilis233 upheld a
lower court's summary judgment for a hospital that complied with
JCAHO standards.234 The Sheffield court looked to the Georgia court's
decision in Joiner with respect to the hospital's use of reasonable care
in physician selection. Although Joiner stated that mere compliance
with objective criteria was insufficient, the Sheffield court arguably
found that it was enough to uphold a summary judgment motion.2 5
Even within the same state, courts have continued to send
conflicting signals to hospitals, creating a disincentive for hospitals to
follow industry guidelines strictly.236 This disincentive occurs because
hospitals risk exposure even when they arduously follow objective
standards. Courts hold themselves out as better arbiters of proper
hospital care than the members of the actual medical and hospital
communities. If hospitals knew that full compliance with JCAHO
guidelines would protect them from liability, then they would have a
greater incentive to scrutinize and comply with the guidelines. Under
the present confusion, however, hospitals are left to guess and hope
that a particular court will decide that their compliance is enough. By
holding hospitals liable for the negligent selection or negligent
231. Id. The court cited an earlier Iowa case, Menzel v. Morse, for the proposition that the
standards presented in the case were "insufficient, without additional reliable interpretative data.
Id. at 486 (citing Menzel v. Morse, 362 N.W.2d 465, 471 (Iowa, 1985)).
232. Van Iperen, 392 N.W.2d 480.
233. 170 Ga. App. 62,316 S.E.2d 493 (Ga. App. 1984).
234. Id. at 495. The court stated that the JCAHO standards were the "most universally
accepted standards and procedures in the United States." The court then found that the
defendant hospital had followed these standards when it appointed Dr. Zilis to its staff. Id. at 494.
235. Id. The court upheld summary judgment on procedural grounds unrelated to JCAHO
compliance. Nevertheless, the decision creates some confusion.
236. Compare, for example, Sheffield, 316 S.E.2d at 494, with Joiner, 186 S.E.2d at 308.
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supervision of staff physicians, courts already impose liability on
hospitals based on attenuated reasons.2 37  The doctrine of corporate
liability punishes hospitals for indirect wrongs over which they
ultimately may have little or no control. If courts are going to impose
this attenuated liability, they have an obligation to apply the doctrine
consistently so that hospitals can protect themsselves from liability.
The fact that JCAHO guidelines are intentionally broad also thwarts
strict compliance with them.
C. Other Ways That Courts Have Addressed the Standards Issue--
Further Judicial Inconsistency
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in the landmark case of John-
son v. Misericordia Community Hospital,23 established a hospital duty
of proper selection, but it did not create a standard of care to assess
this newly imposed duty.29 The court maintained that the established
tort standard of "ordinary care under the circumstances" still served
as the standard of care to assess corporate liability. 240 This holding
avoids the standards issue. Instead of applying a new standard of
care to a new theory of liability, the court relied on an established tort
doctrine that did not address the corporate liability issue
sufficiently.241
The court in Elam v. College Park Hospital24 relied on a
combination of JCAHO standards and statutory authority in
rendering its decision. Although reliance on JCAHO standards would
provide the needed judicial consistency, the addition of statutory
authority only confuses the issue. If courts in each state consistently
relied on certain JCAHO guidelines along with appropriate state
statutes, then perhaps a combination of the standards would provide
hospitals with a workable framework to follow. Unfortunately, courts
have neglected to offer any uniformity. The frequently cited case of
Elam provides another example of the inconsistent and uneven
judicial treatment of the corporate liability issue.
237. See Comment, 7 Creighton L. Rev. at 261 (cited in note 13).
238. 99 Wis. 2d 708, 301 N.W.2d 156 (1981). Johnson is discussed in notes 55-67 and
accompanying text.
239. Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 170.
240. Id. at 171.
241. Id. at 171-72. See Davenport, Note, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. at 467-68 (cited in note 24).
242. 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982).
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VII. How COURTS SHOULD APPLY THE STANDARDS
Courts must apply the corporate liability standards evenly and
consistently to give the doctrine any true credibility. Without consis-
tent judicial application of the standards, corporate liability presents
hospitals with the daunting specter of potentially limitless liability.
Courts must apply a uniform set of standards to define hospitals'
duties under the corporate liability doctrine.
The JCAHO guidelines are the appropriate guidelines for
courts to rely on in establishing hospital duties in the area of phy-
sician selection and supervision. The guidelines are updated annu-
ally, are representative of industry changes, and are subscribed to on
a national basis.24 They also are written by and for the hospital
industry, and hospitals subscribe to them on a voluntary basis.244 The
hospital community is in the best position to define and develop the
specific guidelines that will safeguard hospital autonomy.245
Accordingly, compliance with these standards should serve as a safe
harbor from corporate liability. Corporate liability does not replace
existing tort and contract remedies but provides additional remedies
to those that have been available historically. Consequently, the
doctrine should serve as a viable option only on a limited basis.
Compliance with JCAHO standards should serve as the litmus test for
corporate liability. Future courts should follow the Pedroza decision
and hold that compliance with these standards alone is sufficient to
protect a hospital from corporate liability.2 46
The majority of courts throughout the country now use a
national standard of care to assess all types of medical malpractice. 247
The national standard, as codified in the JCAHO guidelines, is based
on the knowledge and practices of the ordinary hospital, regardless of
the hospital's location.248 National standards raise the quality of all
hospitals, treat all hospitals equally in the eyes of the law, provide
incentives for hospitals with limited skills and resources to improve,
and reflect national health plans and priorities.249 National JCAHO
243. See notes 61-73 and accompanying text.
244. See Part V.A of this Note (discussing the JCAHO).
245. Id.
246. See text accompanying notes 212-14.
247. See, for example, Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Assoc., 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d
245, 252 (Md. App. 1975) (ruling that courts should use a national standard when assessing
hospital and physician liability).
248. Id. All hospitals may maintain certain customs and practices no matter where they are
or how they operate. The national standard offers a single, correct way to provide basic care.
249. National standards seem particularly appropriate in light of the new Clinton health-
care plan.
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standards will allow courts to apply the corporate liability doctrine in
a practical and responsible manner.
Some comentators argue that courts should not use national
standards because of the inherent differences in health care that exist
in communities throughout the country.250 Opponents of a national
standard argue that hospitals must have flexibility in addressing
health-care concerns.251 They also argue that flexibility is necessary to
handle the variety of health-care concerns that both urban and rural,
as well as wealthy and poor, communities must overcome.2 52
A national corporate liability standard is indeed desirable.
These proposed national standards would not regulate the health-care
system itself. Hospitals need a certain amount of flexibility to deter-
mine how they may provide adequate health care in the communities
in which they operate. National standards would not deny a hospital
its autonomy of operation within established minimum criteria and
would not mandate the specific manner in which hospitals could
achieve compliance.25 Instead, the standards would require compli-
ance itself, rather than imposing a blueprint for how to achieve this
compliance. Proper JCAHO national standards should allow hospitals
needed flexibility, while still providing workable parameters for both
hospitals and courts to follow. These national standards should
provide a framework for hospitals and courts to follow when assessing
corporate liability duties. Furthermore, the hospital community
developed the JCAHO. The JCAHO, therefore, works with member
250. The locality rule is based not on the knowledge or style of the particular physician but
rather on the resources and facilities available in the specific area. See Shilkret, 349 A.2d at 248
(citing Jon R. Waltz, The Rise and Gradual Fall of the Locality Rule in Medical Malpractice
Litigation, 18 DePaul L. Rev. 408 (1969)). A health-care facility is not required to do a procedure
if it does not have the resources and tells the patient that it would have performed the procedure
if it had the resources. Shilkret, 349 A.2d at 248.
251. The locality rule has advantages and disadvantages. On the positive side, the locality
rule accounts for economic scarcity and considers the needs of the population in the hospital's
community. The disadvantages include a lack of incentive to improve and the perpetuation of
sub-par resources. For a discussion of the development of the locality rule, see Dwaine E.
Fagerland, Note, Legal Practice: The Locality Rule and Other Limitations of the Standard of
Care: Should Rural and Metropolitan Lawyers Be Held to the Same Standard of Care?, 64 N.D.
L. Rev. 661, 667-75 (1988).
252. The advantages of the local standard do not outweigh the disadvantages that manifest
themselves in the overall lack of consistent quality care. Local standards for corporate liability
will continue to create uncertainity and inequity in the courts' application of the doctrine.
253. For example, the national standards might require hospitals to conduct supervisory
checks on staff physicians every six months. Although these investigations might be mandatory,
each hospital could decide its procedure for the investigations.
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hospitals to develop guidelines specific enough to address the corpo-
rate liabilty issue without eliminating hospital autonomy. 25
Hospitals must have specific guidelines to follow so that they
can take measures to eliminate their potential exposure. If hospital
administrators know what procedures they must follow in selecting
and supervising their staff physicians, they can eliminate future
liability by strictly complying with JCAHO Guidelines. Uniform
standards thus will encourage hospitals to follow the standards
because full compliance will protect the hospitals from corporate
liability exposure. Hospitals will spend the extra time and money to
comply because the protection from exposure will merit the initial
administrative efforts and financial expenditures.
This system of incentives will work only if two steps are taken.
First, the courts must apply the JCAHO standards consistently and
hold that full hospital compliance with these standards will create a
safe harbor from liability. 255  Second, the Joint Commission must
make the JCAHO Guidelines more specific. For example, the Guide-
lines state that hospitals must have a mechanism to evaluate the
medical staff for reappointment.25 The Guidelines specifically men-
tion professional performance, judgement, and technical skills as
factors to consider when reviewing the clinical privileges of a member
of the medical staff.257 Perhaps the Guidelines could provide greater
guidance and discuss the exact mechanism and timeframe for supervi-
sion. The Guidelines might state specifically that all medical staff
must be reviewed formally on a semi-annual basis by an internal peer
review organization and that medical staff non-compliance with ap-
propriate procedure will result in formal reprimand for the first of-
fense and expulsion for the subsequent offense. 25 This specific proce-
dure would give courts and hospital administrators the ability to
254. The JCAHO's self-proclaimed mission is "to impose the quality of health care provided
to the public. The Joint Commission developed standards of quality in collaboration with health
professionals and others and stimulates health care organizations to meet or exceed the standards
through accreditation and the teaching of quality improvement concepts." Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, Hospital Accreditation Statutes (1992) (mission
statement). The JCAHO works with hospitals to develop standards that win benefit both the
industry and the public. Recent data shows that the JCAHO Guidelines and evaluations have had
a positive impact on hospital performance. See, for example, id. at 105-20. See also Richard E.
-Leahy, Comment, Rational Health Policy and the Legal Standard of Care: A Call for Judicial
Deference to Medical Practice Guidelines, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 1483, 1510-13 (1989).
255. Pedroza, 677 P.2d at 170-71 (stating that courts should hold hospitals to the JCAHO
accreditation standards).
256. 1 JCAHO AMH, M.S.-2.7 at 67 (1994).
257. Id.
258. Of course, notice requirements would have to be followed, and antitrust concerns might
come into play.
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determine whether a hospital has breached its corporate supervision
duty while still providing the hospital with some lattitude as to how to
set up the supervision apparatus.
Specific standards undoubtedly will strip hospitals of some of
their autonomy in deciding how to select and supervise their staff
physicians. This loss of autonomy, however, will be outweighed by the
certainty and accountability that specific standards will provide to
hospitals and to courts. The Joint Commission could fashion a specific
set of JCAHO standards that still respect and provide for overall
hospital autonomy of operation. By promulgating a specific set of
standards that the courts could apply evenly, the Joint Commission
would provide the needed framework for the proper application of the
corporate liability doctrine.
Some may argue that JCAHO Guidelines are not appropriate
or valuable guidelines to address liability issues. Although they may
not have been designed to address liability concerns, they are the most
useful standard for determining corporate liability. The hospital
industry has adopted them widely on a voluntary basis. The volun-
tary nature of the Guidelines should allow the market forces to find
the correct degree of specificity needed to address the corporate
liabilty area. If the Guidelines become too onerous or inappropriate
for hospitals, then the hospitals simply may drop their affiliation with
the JCAHO. This, in turn, may dilute the influence and prestige of
the JCAHO, causing the Commission to revise the Guidelines to
reflect hospital concerns more closely in an effort to win back
disgruntled members. Short of hospital withdrawal or boycott, but
possibly more effective, should be the hospitals' input in deciding what
specific guidelines they could or could not follow realistically from a
practical and competitive standpoint. Hospital input should help the
Commission to find the necessary happy medium between clarifying
the corporate liability doctrine and imposing inflexible requirements
on the hospital industry.
The requirements of the National Practitioner Data Bank' 5
provide an example of the type of specific criteria that the JCAHO
should use. The Guidelines currently defer greatly to an individual
hospital's bylaws.2 60  Although this deference may work best for
hospitals in many areas, it does not provide adequate boundaries to
circumscribe the corporate liability threat. A tension exists between
standards that are too broad to guide courts and hospital
259. Part V.B of this Note discusses the Data Bank.
260. 1 JCAHOAMHat 66 (cited in note 175).
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administrators and standards that are too narrow to allow for needed
autonomy for individual hospitals. The Data Bank, however, shows
that a middle ground is possible.
Proponents of the Guidelines might argue that the Guidelines
already are specific enough. This contention certainly has some merit.
For example, the Guidelines now require hospitals to establish a
governing body that . must promulage specific standards.261
Additionally, in the area of clinical privileges, for example, the
Guidelines require core elements-current licensure, relevant training
or experience, and health status-and these elements must be
satisfied with specific documentation. 22 These standards, therefore,
may be specific enough for courts to follow.
More importantly, the courts still have the ultimate duty to
render clear and uniform decisions, regardless of the Guidelines'
specificity. 263 This important factor should not be forgotten amidst the
discussion of the Guidelines. Accordingly, using the Guidelines is only
one suggestion. If the courts develop established common-law
standards within each state, perhaps the JCAHO Guidelines would be
unnecessary. The responsibility ultimately lies with the courts to
apply the corporate liability doctrine consistently. More specific
guidelines will aid this effort, but courts still must render proper
decisions.
Corporate liability has a legitimate place in the law. It may
encourage hospitals to scrutinize their staff physicians more carefully,
thus decreasing the instances of physician malpractice by providing
direct incentives 264 to hospitals to ensure physician competence. This
change should provide a direct benefit to hospital patients. Corporate
liability also may provide relief to injured patients when no other
avenue of compensation exists. Without the tort award that corporate
liability would provide, the taxpayer ultimately would suffer the
burden of providing ongoing, public care to an injured claimant whose
malpractice claim falls through the cracks of the tort system. Because
hospitals are highly profitable, and in the best position to prevent the
malpractice that the corporate liability doctrine is designed to address,
they should bear this burden, not the innocent malpractice victims
and not the innocent taxpayers.
261. Id. at 113.
262. See 2 JCAHO AMH § 3 at 2-11. These requirements, however, still do not specify the
process needed to achieve the desired results.
263. See the discussion of the courts' inconsistent decisions in Part VI of this Note.
264. Health-care commentators increasingly are using economic models to analyze health
care. Incentives are the focal point for much of this analysis. See Havighurst, Health Care Law
and Policy at 73-98 (cited in note 11).
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Corporate liability is, however, quite dangerous if the courts
apply it inconsistently. Without proper judicial application, the doc-
trine may lead to unfettered hospital liability. Hospitals ultimately
will pass this increased liability on to the patient through increased
costs and fees. Courts must not hold the hospital accountable to in-
sure any and all events that occur within hospital walls. Although
courts have maintained that hospitals are not the insurers of every
mishap within the hospital,265 courts have nonetheless treated
hospitals as insurers in some cases. Courts have an obligation to
apply the corporate liability doctrine consistently. The hospital
community, in turn, has an obligation to provide more specific guide-
lines for hospitals and courts to follow.
If hospitals do not believe that they can account for, or prevent
liability for, negligent physician selection or supervision, then perhaps
the greatest value of corporate liability will be lost.266 Hospitals that
otherwise would have an incentive to select and supervise their staff
physicians carefully will not do so if they are unsure about applicable
standards and potential treatment by the courts.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As it now stands, hospitals are in a quandary. If a hospital
does not terminate a staff physician after receiving several
complaints, then the hospital potentially exposes itself to corporate
liability for negligent physician supervision. However, if the hospital
terminates the physician, then the hospital is exposing itself to a
potential antitrust action from the physician.267 Until hospitals can
make decisions based on greater information and with greater
certainty, they will be forced to play the odds. The true losers will be
the patients, who will suffer higher insurance premiums, decreased
access to adequate care, and increased negligent care.
David H. Rutchik
265. See, for example, the discussion in text accompanying note 69.
266. See Part III.B (discussing the justifications for corporate liability).
267. The antitrust issues are of vital importance in this area. They affect physician peer re-
view, for example, which is vital in overall physician selection and supervision. See generally M.
Elizabeth Gee, Antitrust Healthcare Enforcement Analysis (ABA, 1992).
1994]

